Today I wish to answer an old problem, the Euthyphro Dilemma. The dilemma boils down to the question, "Is it morally good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is morally good?"
Now, the question itself is interesting, but the fact that it is framed as a dilemma and sometimes used as a "proof" of the nonexistence of God is... ridiculous. The fact is that whether God does what He does because it is good, or good is defined by what God says, either way one has not developed a contradiction to the idea of God. Just because you don't know which of the options is right doesn't mean that He isn't there.
Now, returning to the question itself, LDS Theology on the point seems quite clear: God commands it because it is morally good. LDS Theology considers there to be moral truth independent of any being, and God is in complete correspondence with this moral truth. He is perfect, and statements such as "God would cease to be God" give us a pretty clear sense that morality is independent of Him, that His perfection is according to external principles by which He may be evaluated, but always passes perfectly. Now, I used the fact that God's morality provides an objectively preferred morality as evidence for Moral Realism, but the argument is not weakened by supposing that God Himself is subject to morality, as the idea of God's activity being evaluated according to external principles is itself a manifestation of a moral reality. Furthermore, the idea of God's morality being a way to learn of moral reality is not weakened, as God is Himself perfect, so that it is a matter not of defining moral reality from God's commandments, but noting perfect correspondence with morality so that we may still trust His commands to give us a perfect sense of moral reality.
Title: Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith
Showing posts with label Apologetics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Apologetics. Show all posts
Sunday, September 11, 2011
Sunday, June 5, 2011
One thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see
Truthfully, the rational arguments are secondary and almost certainly incomplete (I am not a psychologist, and the primary objection one may raise is psychological). I am asserting that there is a spiritual process which is in many ways superior to the rational process, and while I wish to do my best to rationally establish this, to me it seems self-evident, in the sense that an experience with it makes its veracity clear. As to my own knowledge, that is the trick: I have actually had these experiences. They are real. I can't argue with that sense of light and truth except by abandoning my axiom, because the perception is literal and just as real as sensory perception. That is a simple statement of experience: it can't make for a debating point with someone who disagrees, because in a debate you need to agree on material facts and argue consequences, but anyone who disagrees will be disagreeing about a material fact, not a consequence. I do feel an obligation to use the rational as well as the spiritual process to seek truth, and I like Descartes, so a philosophical argument such as I can formulate is requisite, but it's not the heart of it for me.
The title of this post comes from the Bible, and here is where it comes in. I believe the story is illustrative. You see, in John 9, Christ miraculously heals a man, who had been born blind, on the Sabbath. The Jews at this time were divided on whether one could legally perform healing arts on the Sabbath, and some who opposed Him, latching onto this fact, told the man who had been healed that Christ was a sinner for performing the healing. To this the man replied, "Whether he be a sinner or no, I know not: one thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see" (John 9:25). The thing is that this man had never received any real education, whereas those he was arguing with had been taught for years in all the ins and outs of the Law of Moses, which was their basis for the conception of what constituted a sinner. But whatever arguments the Pharisees could make from their vast learning, they could not counter the simple fact that the man was born blind, but could see. Whatever else they might say about Jesus, He did perform that miracle. The same with me: I have had these experiences, and while (unlike the man born blind) I have been trained in reason (especially math and science), I do know what I have seen and experienced.
As a last consideration, I would like to address this beyond myself. Actually, the Book of Mormon prophets Alma and Moroni do the best job here, so I'll give you their suggestions: try the experiment. You see, that's the trick: I tried the experiment, and I got results. Those verses outline the experiment as "ask God." That's really the only way to know about God. You see, I mentioned the issue of control in passing before, and this is the biggest thing that distinguishes a spiritual or religious experiment from a scientific one. In science, we must be in control of what we are studying, whereas in religion we can't be, because we're studying God and He is all-powerful. So you've got to have an open mind and be willing to listen for His answer, but He's told us to ask, so He won't be offended if we do so sincerely. I know He's there based on my own experience. And any good scientist would be willing to perform such a simple experiment in the hopes of learning something so profound, even if he can't be sure whether he will get results.
The title of this post comes from the Bible, and here is where it comes in. I believe the story is illustrative. You see, in John 9, Christ miraculously heals a man, who had been born blind, on the Sabbath. The Jews at this time were divided on whether one could legally perform healing arts on the Sabbath, and some who opposed Him, latching onto this fact, told the man who had been healed that Christ was a sinner for performing the healing. To this the man replied, "Whether he be a sinner or no, I know not: one thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see" (John 9:25). The thing is that this man had never received any real education, whereas those he was arguing with had been taught for years in all the ins and outs of the Law of Moses, which was their basis for the conception of what constituted a sinner. But whatever arguments the Pharisees could make from their vast learning, they could not counter the simple fact that the man was born blind, but could see. Whatever else they might say about Jesus, He did perform that miracle. The same with me: I have had these experiences, and while (unlike the man born blind) I have been trained in reason (especially math and science), I do know what I have seen and experienced.
As a last consideration, I would like to address this beyond myself. Actually, the Book of Mormon prophets Alma and Moroni do the best job here, so I'll give you their suggestions: try the experiment. You see, that's the trick: I tried the experiment, and I got results. Those verses outline the experiment as "ask God." That's really the only way to know about God. You see, I mentioned the issue of control in passing before, and this is the biggest thing that distinguishes a spiritual or religious experiment from a scientific one. In science, we must be in control of what we are studying, whereas in religion we can't be, because we're studying God and He is all-powerful. So you've got to have an open mind and be willing to listen for His answer, but He's told us to ask, so He won't be offended if we do so sincerely. I know He's there based on my own experience. And any good scientist would be willing to perform such a simple experiment in the hopes of learning something so profound, even if he can't be sure whether he will get results.
Friday, June 3, 2011
Is this the real life? Is this just fantasy?
Last time I considered certain experiences, which I said were from God, but, following Descartes, called into question their origin, and in preparation to answering this objection, considered their nature. So the question is, "By what process are things made certain to me in these experiences?" so that we may evaluate whether it fits my label as a form of perception of the outside world and if that perception bears, as I assert, a similar certainty (in fact, I assert that it is greater, but similar is sufficient) to that of sensory perception. There are three potential answers here, so far as I can see. The first two are obvious, as they are the processes of which I am aware by which our minds evaluate information: by a rational process (reasoning it out), or by an emotional process (an emotional reaction). There is also, for a third possibility, my assertion that it is a spiritual process, that God literally and directly grants information to the mind and heart along with a confirmation. This possibility is clearly a matter of perception in the sense which I have discussed: it is external information being delivered directly into my mind, just as sensory perception is external information brought in.
To determine which of these processes is at work, an argument can be developed from the fact that, whatever this process by which I receive light and truth is, I have no power over it: it acts quite independent of me. I do not know how to manufacture the sense of light, nor how to conjure up the ideas that come with it. There are certain rules by which I can increase the probability of such an experience: by moral action. If I do what is morally good and what previous experiences of this sort suggest, then they are more likely to occur. However, there is no definite mental state immediately preceding such an experience, nor an exact action which always produces one. Thus, I conclude that these experiences are produced by means external to myself. They cannot be purely psychological in nature, because I am not the agent of their creation.
One more argument, built around the statement I made, that direction is often a part of these impressions. While not, in my view, as strong as the immediately preceding argument to establish the external nature of these impressions, this allows a quasi-scientific evaluation, for we have specific predictions and, just like scientific knowledge, these predictions should be accurate. Furthermore, if they are psychological in nature, I suspect that these directions will not run contrary to what I believe and desire. However, impressions have done precisely that. I have a few stories I could tell wherein God told me something very specific, contrary to my own wishes, and, by my own careful calculations, foolish and impossible. And yet, when I followed through, the predictions were accurate, and I was certainly happy; when I didn't hearken, I saw the consequences very directly (my greatest regret to date is among these). Now, I'll grant that most of the time this sort of direct cause and effect isn't so evident, but I can think of at least a few cases where not only is the original idea, indifferent of its accuracy, virtually unexplainable from a psychological standpoint, but there's a practical omniscience in its accuracy. Exact science would require more careful control of conditions and a larger sample size, but, quite frankly, we aren't in control here, so we have to deal with what we have, and the results thus far are astoundingly consistent in support of the theistic thesis. Beside this, and probably more importantly, the reliability of this communication or perception is suggested: I find that I can trust these experiences with God as much or more than I can trust my senses (precisely the necessary condition noted above).
Title: Queen, Bohemian Rhapsody
To determine which of these processes is at work, an argument can be developed from the fact that, whatever this process by which I receive light and truth is, I have no power over it: it acts quite independent of me. I do not know how to manufacture the sense of light, nor how to conjure up the ideas that come with it. There are certain rules by which I can increase the probability of such an experience: by moral action. If I do what is morally good and what previous experiences of this sort suggest, then they are more likely to occur. However, there is no definite mental state immediately preceding such an experience, nor an exact action which always produces one. Thus, I conclude that these experiences are produced by means external to myself. They cannot be purely psychological in nature, because I am not the agent of their creation.
One more argument, built around the statement I made, that direction is often a part of these impressions. While not, in my view, as strong as the immediately preceding argument to establish the external nature of these impressions, this allows a quasi-scientific evaluation, for we have specific predictions and, just like scientific knowledge, these predictions should be accurate. Furthermore, if they are psychological in nature, I suspect that these directions will not run contrary to what I believe and desire. However, impressions have done precisely that. I have a few stories I could tell wherein God told me something very specific, contrary to my own wishes, and, by my own careful calculations, foolish and impossible. And yet, when I followed through, the predictions were accurate, and I was certainly happy; when I didn't hearken, I saw the consequences very directly (my greatest regret to date is among these). Now, I'll grant that most of the time this sort of direct cause and effect isn't so evident, but I can think of at least a few cases where not only is the original idea, indifferent of its accuracy, virtually unexplainable from a psychological standpoint, but there's a practical omniscience in its accuracy. Exact science would require more careful control of conditions and a larger sample size, but, quite frankly, we aren't in control here, so we have to deal with what we have, and the results thus far are astoundingly consistent in support of the theistic thesis. Beside this, and probably more importantly, the reliability of this communication or perception is suggested: I find that I can trust these experiences with God as much or more than I can trust my senses (precisely the necessary condition noted above).
Title: Queen, Bohemian Rhapsody
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
Of the things of which we may doubt
I am sure that what I talked about at the end of last post are real experiences with God. However, if I like Descartes (today's title comes from Descartes' Meditations) so much, it's certainly fair to ask, "How can you be sure? Could it not be a psychological illusion? Or, to use Descartes' own example, couldn't it be a powerful evil demon fooling you?" Well, I will start with an axiom: "That which I perceive does, to some extent, represent reality." I know that Descartes does not take advantage of such an axiom, but I've read only summaries of the Meditations (I plan to remedy this soon, but the Meditations are not light reading, and I wish to be able to take my time with them), so I don't understand how he overcomes the general objection of the evil demon and cannot decide whether his proof is valid. Furthermore, I believe that from a utilitarian standpoint my axiom must be considered as true (whether proven true, as Descartes suggests, or taken as an axiom): for if we have no faith in any perception (sensory or otherwise), how shall we ever decide anything or act in any way? I could say considerably more on the subject, but that will probably be left to another post, and let it suffice for the time being to say that decision making is impossible without any input through perception (if you know a way around this, I'd love to hear it). I shall therefore take as the threshold defining "to some extent" for my axiom to be that my sensory perceptions are approximately valid, a single event of sensory perception establishing that which I have perceived to greater than 90% certainty (90% is an arbitrary figure here, but I believe it to be simultaneously conservative--I don't think my eyes trick me more than 10% of the time--and sufficient to establish reality--in part because things are often attested to many times--and anyway, the exact figure does not matter from here on out, but simply illustrates that we can give a figure which is simultaneously conservative and establishes reality).
In this case, the question to be posed is whether there is any sort of perception to which I may attribute my knowledge of God. Well, yes. In a literal sense, by His communicating with me. This I perceive quite literally in my own self: using poetic or scriptural language, in my mind and heart. I certainly perceive something which is beyond myself, though this perception is different from sensory perception in the sense that I am not the primary active agent, as I may be argued to be in the case of sensory perception (actually, it may be more accurate to say that sensory perception is also passive, as our eyes do not actively bring light into them, but passively absorb light from our surroundings; but argue as you wish, whether the senses are active or passive, it does not matter for my purposes today). This does not address the psychological argument, and so you may ask, "Is this, which you call the Spirit, not merely an emotional response?" I respond that it is not, but you may certainly press the issue, so now I'll have to explain more about these experiences.
Let me note that it is extremely distinctive. It is simply not like any emotion, so if it is simply an internal emotion then it is a unique one. The fact is that I cannot simply call it love (I have been in love before, and it is not just this), or calm (I have certainly been calm), or happiness (I have been happy before), or any other single emotion that I have experienced separate from this. In fact, it is all of these and more: love, peace, and joy, yes, but there is more to it than that.
First, there is a sensation which I have never heard described better than as "light." This is perhaps the most distinctive bit, but by its distinctive nature I am afraid that I am completely unable to convey it in words, because usually we describe sensation and perception in terms of comparisons. If this seems like a cop-out, then describe the taste of salt, or the color yellow, or joy without comparison or contrast with something else. If you can, then I hope that you have this kind of spiritual experience: you'll communicate it better than me, that's for certain. Regardless, the point stands that it is distinctive, so that I may say what is and is not an experience of this type.
Further, from the first time that I (somewhat unexpectedly) had this very distinct impression of light, I knew, quite simply, two things: that it was God, and that what I was saying at that moment was true. This brings us to the second, and related, observation: with this sense of "light" there is always conveyed truth, knowledge. Intelligence is always communicated. Occasionally it is simply certainty, but most often there is further insight, direction, or clarity of understanding. This is interesting, and I will have to come back to it later. However, it seems that the "certainty" part is at the heart of the questions for now, so that will be my starting point for next time.
Title: Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation 1
In this case, the question to be posed is whether there is any sort of perception to which I may attribute my knowledge of God. Well, yes. In a literal sense, by His communicating with me. This I perceive quite literally in my own self: using poetic or scriptural language, in my mind and heart. I certainly perceive something which is beyond myself, though this perception is different from sensory perception in the sense that I am not the primary active agent, as I may be argued to be in the case of sensory perception (actually, it may be more accurate to say that sensory perception is also passive, as our eyes do not actively bring light into them, but passively absorb light from our surroundings; but argue as you wish, whether the senses are active or passive, it does not matter for my purposes today). This does not address the psychological argument, and so you may ask, "Is this, which you call the Spirit, not merely an emotional response?" I respond that it is not, but you may certainly press the issue, so now I'll have to explain more about these experiences.
Let me note that it is extremely distinctive. It is simply not like any emotion, so if it is simply an internal emotion then it is a unique one. The fact is that I cannot simply call it love (I have been in love before, and it is not just this), or calm (I have certainly been calm), or happiness (I have been happy before), or any other single emotion that I have experienced separate from this. In fact, it is all of these and more: love, peace, and joy, yes, but there is more to it than that.
First, there is a sensation which I have never heard described better than as "light." This is perhaps the most distinctive bit, but by its distinctive nature I am afraid that I am completely unable to convey it in words, because usually we describe sensation and perception in terms of comparisons. If this seems like a cop-out, then describe the taste of salt, or the color yellow, or joy without comparison or contrast with something else. If you can, then I hope that you have this kind of spiritual experience: you'll communicate it better than me, that's for certain. Regardless, the point stands that it is distinctive, so that I may say what is and is not an experience of this type.
Further, from the first time that I (somewhat unexpectedly) had this very distinct impression of light, I knew, quite simply, two things: that it was God, and that what I was saying at that moment was true. This brings us to the second, and related, observation: with this sense of "light" there is always conveyed truth, knowledge. Intelligence is always communicated. Occasionally it is simply certainty, but most often there is further insight, direction, or clarity of understanding. This is interesting, and I will have to come back to it later. However, it seems that the "certainty" part is at the heart of the questions for now, so that will be my starting point for next time.
Title: Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation 1
Sunday, May 29, 2011
When they are learned they think they are wise
This may well be a topic not relegated to a single post, or even a single series of posts... it's central to my purpose and there's a lot that could be said. It may be said that the subject at hand is epistemology, which has occupied philosophers for some time. I will, however, begin with simply addressing the objection, as voiced by the Nobel prize winning chemist Herbert A. Hauptman, that you cannot be a good scientist and believe in God, and, beyond this, "this kind of belief is damaging to the well-being of the human race." I have put myself on here with science and religion comprising two of the three things which I've been thinking about and wish to articulate most, and while it is unfortunate that such a defense is necessary from more than a possible philosophical standpoint (I quite like Descartes and methodic doubt), it seems that I should first reconcile my trust in both of these viewpoints. After all, as Francis S. Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health and former director of the National Human Genome Research Institute said, "It should not be a taboo subject, but frankly it often is in scientific circles" (both quotes to this point are from a New York Times article from a few years back).
First, I would like to point out by counterexample that Dr. Hauptman, for all his genius in chemistry, must be wrong. Either that, or he must assert that Newton, Euler, Maxwell, Gauss, Faraday, Einstein, Heisenberg, Galileo, Cantor, Dyson, Kepler, Millikan, Compton, Copernicus, and... well... you get the idea... were not good scientists. I know this is not the first time this argument has been used, but I've never heard any adequate answer for it. The burden of proof certainly rests on Dr. Hauptman for this one. He may assert that Maxwell, because of his belief in God, was not a good scientist, but he'd better be ready to prove it, because I am quite ready to say that Maxwell was one of the greatest theoretical physicists that ever lived. The other possible answer to my objection is to claim that those on my list did not really believe in God. As to this, he must deal with the fact that Newton wrote more about Theology than Mathematics and Physics. I think it is hopeless to try to disprove the counterexample, and he does himself a severe discredit by ignoring such an elementary argument against his claims (any mathematician knows that it only takes a counterexample to disprove a claim of impossibility).
Now that we've got the obvious argument out of the way, I'd like to consider my own argument. To quote xkcd, "'Ideas are tested by experiment.' That is the core of science. Everything else is bookkeeping." This is the heart of the argument for me. I said in my first post that I know that God is there from my own experience, and emphasized that this is key. I don't think I can stress it enough. Science is about testing ideas by observation and experiment. By my own observation and experiment, I know that there is a God. Therefore, it's not only consistent for me to be a scientist and believe in God: it is actually inconsistent for me to be a scientist and not believe in God. To fail to believe in God would be to ignore the results of my own experimentation, which is precisely one of the things that makes a bad scientist.
"But," you argue, "What about others' beliefs? What about their evidence?" Well, I won't give the complete argument here: there's certainly need for considerable discussion on the subject of contradictions in belief, and that deserves a whole post. But I will give a restricted argument, pertaining only to atheists. For atheists, my argument is that they have no evidence against God. In fact, evidence against God is philosophically impossible. God is by definition omniscient and omnipotent. As a result, He can do as He pleases, in the most complete and literal sense, and there's nothing you can do about it. The Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB) does nothing to prove or disprove the existence of such a being: if He wants, He can allow, create, or disallow such a background by definition. The fact that we measure such a background is evidence that if there is a God, then He must have allowed or created the CMB, and probably allowed or created a Big Bang cosmology (as this is the simplest and best explanation for the CMB to date), while if there is not a God, then the Big Bang cosmology is probably accurate, whatever its source. Neither does evolution preclude His existence, by a similar argument. Thus, there is no evidence which excludes God; indeed, there cannot be: the theist can claim privileged information from an omnipotent being, while the atheist cannot control an omnipotent being sufficiently well to verify His nonexistence.
"Aha!" exclaims Richard Dawkins, "We may not be able to exclude God, but by Occam's Razor, it is best practice to assume that there is no God at this point! We don't need God to explain things, so it is simpler to say that such a being does not exist." Well, Occam's Razor, while useful, isn't a perfect method for dividing truth from error (indeed, Occam's Razor has given us several theories which were later shown to be only approximations of more accurate descriptions), but, more to the point, that statement is wrong. You may be a preeminent biologist, but you're completely neglecting that God is needed to explain things: particularly my own personal experience with Him. There are other things to explain, miracles and such (even in my family), but I will work from my own experience. Remember, the idea is to understand why I believe what I do about God, and this kind of experience has the preeminent place in this understanding.
Title: 2 Nephi 9:21
First, I would like to point out by counterexample that Dr. Hauptman, for all his genius in chemistry, must be wrong. Either that, or he must assert that Newton, Euler, Maxwell, Gauss, Faraday, Einstein, Heisenberg, Galileo, Cantor, Dyson, Kepler, Millikan, Compton, Copernicus, and... well... you get the idea... were not good scientists. I know this is not the first time this argument has been used, but I've never heard any adequate answer for it. The burden of proof certainly rests on Dr. Hauptman for this one. He may assert that Maxwell, because of his belief in God, was not a good scientist, but he'd better be ready to prove it, because I am quite ready to say that Maxwell was one of the greatest theoretical physicists that ever lived. The other possible answer to my objection is to claim that those on my list did not really believe in God. As to this, he must deal with the fact that Newton wrote more about Theology than Mathematics and Physics. I think it is hopeless to try to disprove the counterexample, and he does himself a severe discredit by ignoring such an elementary argument against his claims (any mathematician knows that it only takes a counterexample to disprove a claim of impossibility).
Now that we've got the obvious argument out of the way, I'd like to consider my own argument. To quote xkcd, "'Ideas are tested by experiment.' That is the core of science. Everything else is bookkeeping." This is the heart of the argument for me. I said in my first post that I know that God is there from my own experience, and emphasized that this is key. I don't think I can stress it enough. Science is about testing ideas by observation and experiment. By my own observation and experiment, I know that there is a God. Therefore, it's not only consistent for me to be a scientist and believe in God: it is actually inconsistent for me to be a scientist and not believe in God. To fail to believe in God would be to ignore the results of my own experimentation, which is precisely one of the things that makes a bad scientist.
"But," you argue, "What about others' beliefs? What about their evidence?" Well, I won't give the complete argument here: there's certainly need for considerable discussion on the subject of contradictions in belief, and that deserves a whole post. But I will give a restricted argument, pertaining only to atheists. For atheists, my argument is that they have no evidence against God. In fact, evidence against God is philosophically impossible. God is by definition omniscient and omnipotent. As a result, He can do as He pleases, in the most complete and literal sense, and there's nothing you can do about it. The Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB) does nothing to prove or disprove the existence of such a being: if He wants, He can allow, create, or disallow such a background by definition. The fact that we measure such a background is evidence that if there is a God, then He must have allowed or created the CMB, and probably allowed or created a Big Bang cosmology (as this is the simplest and best explanation for the CMB to date), while if there is not a God, then the Big Bang cosmology is probably accurate, whatever its source. Neither does evolution preclude His existence, by a similar argument. Thus, there is no evidence which excludes God; indeed, there cannot be: the theist can claim privileged information from an omnipotent being, while the atheist cannot control an omnipotent being sufficiently well to verify His nonexistence.
"Aha!" exclaims Richard Dawkins, "We may not be able to exclude God, but by Occam's Razor, it is best practice to assume that there is no God at this point! We don't need God to explain things, so it is simpler to say that such a being does not exist." Well, Occam's Razor, while useful, isn't a perfect method for dividing truth from error (indeed, Occam's Razor has given us several theories which were later shown to be only approximations of more accurate descriptions), but, more to the point, that statement is wrong. You may be a preeminent biologist, but you're completely neglecting that God is needed to explain things: particularly my own personal experience with Him. There are other things to explain, miracles and such (even in my family), but I will work from my own experience. Remember, the idea is to understand why I believe what I do about God, and this kind of experience has the preeminent place in this understanding.
Title: 2 Nephi 9:21
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