Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Irreligion as the state religion would be the worst of all combinations

Presupposing that at least some, such as myself, view religious conviction as an important source of morality, and morality being a basis for popular sovereignty within my (and, I presume, some others') political philosophy, and considering the controversy of the subject, it may be natural to address the role of religion in public discourse at this point.

First, let me state what I believe to be a significant problem: In many circles, a religious conviction is viewed as illegitimate, an unsound basis for belief, and those subscribing to such convictions are even, at times, viewed as diminished by those views (recall my first post, in which I cited the allegation that a person couldn't be a good scientist and religious). In many circles, a person acting from religious conviction in the public sphere is viewed as improper, and it's even argued that such actions are contrary to the establishment clause in the First Amendment of the US Constitution.

I would like to go on the record as saying that such a view of religious conviction is not only incorrect, but inconsistent.

First of all, there is the problem that Elder Maxwell noted way back in 1978, that such an approach actually establishes irreligion as a preferred religion. All opinions must be placed on irreligious terms if action from religious conviction is considered illegitimate.

Second, under such a view, one must appeal to a philosophical axiom which is just as scientifically unprovable as a religious conviction. Science only makes measurement of what is, and if what is differs from what ought to be, then science can know nothing of it, having no way of measuring what ought to be independent of what is. Thus, science can discover nothing of the basic axioms of Ethics. Similarly, Mathematics is based on an axiomatic structure: you must assume something before you can build anything up. Logic requires basic facts to make conclusions. In short, the methods by which there is any certainty in a secular world can say nothing of the most basic principles of Ethics. One requires certain unprovable definitions and axioms in order to assert anything contrary to Moral Realism and the ability to gain moral truth from a divine source. We are now bound to return to a question very similar to the old one; now it is, "Under what philosophical set of axioms should we act?" My answer is to let everyone act on the philosophical ground that they see fit in public discourse, for there is no objective and independent way of determining which world views have validity and which do not. Yet dismissing or barring religion from public discourse arbitrarily decides what, out of all these possibilities, is right.

And what of people in public office? The same applies. Supposing that I were to run for public office, then my philosophical and moral beliefs would be quite visible. If the people wish to elect a Moral Realist with certain beliefs about moral truth, who will scrupulously attempt to balance their wishes with his morality (generally siding with them, but perhaps breaking with the majority at times), and who will seek to serve them, then why shouldn't I, religious beliefs and all, be allowed to serve? In fact, even if I weren't to make such efforts to balance popular opinion with my beliefs, even if I were to completely ignore my constituency and simply vote based on what I think, so long as the people knowingly and willingly chose my moral sense rather than a willingness to cater to their opinion, could they not do so (now, I do believe that I would feel a need to regard the opinion of my constituency, yet the argument stands, so far as I can see)? If the people see me as fit, see my moral code as good, and believe me to be wise, then my actions should not be viewed as anything less than legitimate. If they want the wisest, most honest, and most moral person that they can find, rather than one selected by any number of other criteria (such as choosing someone based on whether they will vote as they wish), and believe that I am him, then their choice for integrity, wisdom, and morality should be honored. It is only if I were to act dishonestly, to attempt to deceive the electorate, perhaps hiding my Moral Realism until I was in office, that actions based on that would not carry the full weight of legitimacy offered by the will of the people.

Now, two more points: First, this goes both ways. In a society built on liberty and popular sovereignty, everyone must be free to act on his philosophical and moral beliefs. An atheist and a Moral Relativist treating all of society as a social contract should be free to use his vote and his voice to put forward those parts of the contract which he sees as most to his benefit. A Moral Realist should be free to advocate whatever he believes to be right in the society, whatever his source for that belief.

Second, it is important to realize that there is at least one type of public discourse where all must be done from common philosophical ground: in a debate. For if there is not common ground in debate with regards to the pertinent axioms and material facts then a civil debate becomes extremely difficult, possibly meaningless. If the differences lie in things which cannot be successfully argued (such as basic axioms), then what can a debate tell us? Perhaps a reader can suggest a solution, but I, for one, do not see how a debate can be effective if those arguing do not share this kind of common ground. The best solution that I can see is for those involved to agree on the axioms under which they will be operating for the purpose of the debate beforehand, but honestly this, to me, indicates that modern political debates are unlikely to be effective... and I would assert that my observation confirms this.

Title: Neal A. Maxwell, Meeting the Challenges of Today

No comments:

Post a Comment