Last time I considered certain experiences, which I said were from God, but, following Descartes, called into question their origin, and in preparation to answering this objection, considered their nature. So the question is, "By what process are things made certain to me in these experiences?" so that we may evaluate whether it fits my label as a form of perception of the outside world and if that perception bears, as I assert, a similar certainty (in fact, I assert that it is greater, but similar is sufficient) to that of sensory perception. There are three potential answers here, so far as I can see. The first two are obvious, as they are the processes of which I am aware by which our minds evaluate information: by a rational process (reasoning it out), or by an emotional process (an emotional reaction). There is also, for a third possibility, my assertion that it is a spiritual process, that God literally and directly grants information to the mind and heart along with a confirmation. This possibility is clearly a matter of perception in the sense which I have discussed: it is external information being delivered directly into my mind, just as sensory perception is external information brought in.
To determine which of these processes is at work, an argument can be developed from the fact that, whatever this process by which I receive light and truth is, I have no power over it: it acts quite independent of me. I do not know how to manufacture the sense of light, nor how to conjure up the ideas that come with it. There are certain rules by which I can increase the probability of such an experience: by moral action. If I do what is morally good and what previous experiences of this sort suggest, then they are more likely to occur. However, there is no definite mental state immediately preceding such an experience, nor an exact action which always produces one. Thus, I conclude that these experiences are produced by means external to myself. They cannot be purely psychological in nature, because I am not the agent of their creation.
One more argument, built around the statement I made, that direction is often a part of these impressions. While not, in my view, as strong as the immediately preceding argument to establish the external nature of these impressions, this allows a quasi-scientific evaluation, for we have specific predictions and, just like scientific knowledge, these predictions should be accurate. Furthermore, if they are psychological in nature, I suspect that these directions will not run contrary to what I believe and desire. However, impressions have done precisely that. I have a few stories I could tell wherein God told me something very specific, contrary to my own wishes, and, by my own careful calculations, foolish and impossible. And yet, when I followed through, the predictions were accurate, and I was certainly happy; when I didn't hearken, I saw the consequences very directly (my greatest regret to date is among these). Now, I'll grant that most of the time this sort of direct cause and effect isn't so evident, but I can think of at least a few cases where not only is the original idea, indifferent of its accuracy, virtually unexplainable from a psychological standpoint, but there's a practical omniscience in its accuracy. Exact science would require more careful control of conditions and a larger sample size, but, quite frankly, we aren't in control here, so we have to deal with what we have, and the results thus far are astoundingly consistent in support of the theistic thesis. Beside this, and probably more importantly, the reliability of this communication or perception is suggested: I find that I can trust these experiences with God as much or more than I can trust my senses (precisely the necessary condition noted above).
Title: Queen, Bohemian Rhapsody
To determine which of these processes is at work, an argument can be developed from the fact that, whatever this process by which I receive light and truth is, I have no power over it: it acts quite independent of me. I do not know how to manufacture the sense of light, nor how to conjure up the ideas that come with it. There are certain rules by which I can increase the probability of such an experience: by moral action. If I do what is morally good and what previous experiences of this sort suggest, then they are more likely to occur. However, there is no definite mental state immediately preceding such an experience, nor an exact action which always produces one. Thus, I conclude that these experiences are produced by means external to myself. They cannot be purely psychological in nature, because I am not the agent of their creation.
One more argument, built around the statement I made, that direction is often a part of these impressions. While not, in my view, as strong as the immediately preceding argument to establish the external nature of these impressions, this allows a quasi-scientific evaluation, for we have specific predictions and, just like scientific knowledge, these predictions should be accurate. Furthermore, if they are psychological in nature, I suspect that these directions will not run contrary to what I believe and desire. However, impressions have done precisely that. I have a few stories I could tell wherein God told me something very specific, contrary to my own wishes, and, by my own careful calculations, foolish and impossible. And yet, when I followed through, the predictions were accurate, and I was certainly happy; when I didn't hearken, I saw the consequences very directly (my greatest regret to date is among these). Now, I'll grant that most of the time this sort of direct cause and effect isn't so evident, but I can think of at least a few cases where not only is the original idea, indifferent of its accuracy, virtually unexplainable from a psychological standpoint, but there's a practical omniscience in its accuracy. Exact science would require more careful control of conditions and a larger sample size, but, quite frankly, we aren't in control here, so we have to deal with what we have, and the results thus far are astoundingly consistent in support of the theistic thesis. Beside this, and probably more importantly, the reliability of this communication or perception is suggested: I find that I can trust these experiences with God as much or more than I can trust my senses (precisely the necessary condition noted above).
Title: Queen, Bohemian Rhapsody
No comments:
Post a Comment