With all of the conceptions from my last post in mind, I would like to begin to evaluate them and determine and articulate what it is that I believe. I must first say that justice is not the same as fairness. In many cases they are identical, but in my mind justice is most fundamentally the first of these conceptions. Justice is primarily the moral principle of consequences matching actions. The other conceptions, I think, are more accurately identified as fairness. To justify this statement, it seems sufficient to me to note that this is the "classical" meaning of the two words (justice and fairness), and that the terms have been combined in some discussion primarily for rhetorical purposes (the term "social justice" having been coined in the 19th century to put equality on the same rhetorical footing as the preeminent position that justice enjoyed in political philosophy and legal theory), though it seems more sensible to keep the two terms separate, if only to avoid confusion.
That said, I've merely shifted the discussion semantically: Is it justice or fairness that should have a preeminent place in the law? Or can they both enjoy an equal place? Well, they cannot both be universally observed, for at times fairness may even contradict the fundamental justice of actions and consequences: For example, a "perfectly equal" society requires that rewards are the same for all, independent of their actions, so that consequences to actions simply do not exist. I can reject this conception without hesitation, for it is contrary even to physical truth: once again, reality is not kind to the belief that consequences to actions may be ignored. Thus, as a practical matter, dismissing consequences to action seems untenable. More to the point, I may appeal to both revelation and conscience to assert that justice is a fundamental moral law. I think there may also be a logical argument for justice being an essential principle, yet I have been unable to formulate it, so that for the time being I will, from a logical perspective, take the status of the justice of consequences for actions as a moral law which ought to be satisfied (at the very least in most cases) as axiomatic. Perhaps in a later post I will find myself more capable of articulating some logic to it, or perhaps a reader may supply it, but I cannot do it now.
I have utterly rejected the "perfect equality" conception of fairness as inconsistent with the moral law of justice (at least in an imperfect society), but it is important to consider some of the other ideas of equality. The requirement of equal treatment, rewarding equally for equal goods and services or punishing equally for equal crimes, seems to me a part of the ideal of fairness, but not universally required by morality. Of course, in the restricted matter of government, I believe that equal treatment under the law is emergent from the principle of justice, for any government involvement in punishment for wrongdoing (rather than leaving it to God, which may be called for under certain circumstances, as considered in the recent post on liberty) must be regulated by the principle of justice, in which the consequences correspond to the action, or the punishment fits the crime. That at times a pardon may be reasonable as an act of mercy or in consequence of actions external to the crime, but the point is that in a general sense, all should be treated equally under the law because the moral consequences that fit actions are consistent from one person to another. On the other hand, in private matters, a person may deal with one person justly, and then for the same actions reward another person more, giving the second person what we may consider a gift in addition to the just reward for their actions. One can only justly act charitably in this manner with his own means, so that a manager at a business paying his friends more out of money which is not actually his is unjust, but if the owner of the business were to pay one more than another out of kindness, or if the manager were to take out of his own pocket and give money to an employee, I could not consider those actions wrong in and of themselves (although we may get into a complex discussion of motives here, and these actions may be dishonest when taken with other things going on). You may argue that gifts in and of themselves are not just, as they reward where there was no action, but I do not believe that that which benefits people beyond the minimum requirements of justice is immoral, that injustice can only be invoked as immorality when the injustice is in some way harmful to someone involved. When a gift is given of the free will of the giver, then such a case is not immoral.
There is also the issue of equality in matters beyond the control of those involved. I still do not believe that this is justice, but I will also suggest that inequality is not enforced by justice. A child of rich parents is not entitled by justice to his parents' wealth, for it does not come in consequence of his actions. If the parents bestow riches on their child as a gift, then this is not an offense against justice, but neither is it an offense against justice for the child to receive none of his parents' riches. In this particular example, there is an interaction between fairness and liberty, wherein the libertarian view asserts that the parents have the right to give their riches to the child, but fairness asserts that the child has no more right to the money than any other, and so it should be distributed among many children. However, justice itself is not implicated. Other examples such as natural disaster, compensation for loss due to crime, and the accidental discovery of oil in your backyard have similar results: justice neither obliges nor prevents the loss or benefit from being shared across the population, but other principles do tend to conflict with fairness in each case, leading to a more complicated resolution to the question of what ought to be done. These sorts of questions ought to be addressed (and I may approach some of them in future posts), but that will leave the subject of justice, and each problem must be addressed individually, so I will have to consider these issues another time.
Title: T.H. White, The Once and Future King
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
Sunday, August 28, 2011
And Justice for All
Last time I talked about liberty, and now I would like to approach the subject of justice. Both of these are, as I see it, central to the role of government, and so it seems appropriate to discuss them more or less together like this, and before further approaching political philosophy.
The problem with justice is that it is very broad and includes a wide variety of meanings. However, as with liberty, as a moral realist I believe that there is a basic principle of true justice, and the question is still what constitutes this true justice. It may include a variety of ideas, but let us begin to evaluate some common theories of justice, recalling the required principle of consistency, that any moral law must be consistent with other moral laws.
First, there is the basic conception of justice that one ought to receive consequences according to his choices and actions. Under this conception, a criminal is brought to justice when he receives punishment for his crime, a person is justly dealt with when he receives full payment for a contract entered into, and it is injustice for a person to receive payment other than what is merited by the good or service he is providing (although this last example is complicated by questions of whether there is an absolute and fundamental value which may be attached to a particular good or service, so that most often it is only by deceit, such as failing to pay a previously agreed upon amount, that we consider this type of infraction against justice, though there are some counterexamples).
Second, there are several conceptions regarding equality. One idea is that one must reward or punish everyone equally. Indeed, it has been asserted that any variation in pay for similar jobs in the workplace (for example) is injustice. Alternately, there is a conception in which variation in advantages and disadvantages outside of one's control (such as one's family's economic situation) is inherently unjust. The strongest conception relating to equality is that justice demands that all people have complete equality in terms of economics, freedoms, and privileges.
Finally, there are conceptions related to need, requiring that everyone have certain minimum needs and liberties allotted them in order to fulfill justice. In many ways this is related to equality, though perhaps not quite as strong, and perhaps imposing slightly different standards (for in such a conception of justice, the ideal society gives more to a section of society because of their greater need, contrary to the conception based in equality).
There may yet be other conceptions of justice, but these, I think, can mostly be formulated as intermediates between the above. If anyone thinks of another common conception, then please comment so that I may address this as well.
In the next post I will take these different conceptions and attempt to determine which of these formulations (or what combination of them) corresponds to my personal theory of justice.
Title: U.S. Pledge of Allegiance
The problem with justice is that it is very broad and includes a wide variety of meanings. However, as with liberty, as a moral realist I believe that there is a basic principle of true justice, and the question is still what constitutes this true justice. It may include a variety of ideas, but let us begin to evaluate some common theories of justice, recalling the required principle of consistency, that any moral law must be consistent with other moral laws.
First, there is the basic conception of justice that one ought to receive consequences according to his choices and actions. Under this conception, a criminal is brought to justice when he receives punishment for his crime, a person is justly dealt with when he receives full payment for a contract entered into, and it is injustice for a person to receive payment other than what is merited by the good or service he is providing (although this last example is complicated by questions of whether there is an absolute and fundamental value which may be attached to a particular good or service, so that most often it is only by deceit, such as failing to pay a previously agreed upon amount, that we consider this type of infraction against justice, though there are some counterexamples).
Second, there are several conceptions regarding equality. One idea is that one must reward or punish everyone equally. Indeed, it has been asserted that any variation in pay for similar jobs in the workplace (for example) is injustice. Alternately, there is a conception in which variation in advantages and disadvantages outside of one's control (such as one's family's economic situation) is inherently unjust. The strongest conception relating to equality is that justice demands that all people have complete equality in terms of economics, freedoms, and privileges.
Finally, there are conceptions related to need, requiring that everyone have certain minimum needs and liberties allotted them in order to fulfill justice. In many ways this is related to equality, though perhaps not quite as strong, and perhaps imposing slightly different standards (for in such a conception of justice, the ideal society gives more to a section of society because of their greater need, contrary to the conception based in equality).
There may yet be other conceptions of justice, but these, I think, can mostly be formulated as intermediates between the above. If anyone thinks of another common conception, then please comment so that I may address this as well.
In the next post I will take these different conceptions and attempt to determine which of these formulations (or what combination of them) corresponds to my personal theory of justice.
Title: U.S. Pledge of Allegiance
Sunday, August 21, 2011
All men... are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights
Now I would like to turn to some of the most important moral principles for political philosophy. First will be liberty. I would like to consider what liberty is, and how we might reinforce the argument for popular sovereignty by appealing to liberty, and perhaps narrow a bit what type of government may be ideal.
Of just about any idea or principle the moral realist may ask, "Is it good, bad, or neutral?" Of course, in a previous post I suggested two tools for evaluating the answer to this question: Asking God and conscience. Now, both of these methods confirm to me that at least some idea of liberty (for there is a variety of ideas as to what liberty means) is inherently good; furthermore, it seems that most people agree with this, so it seems that we would do best to assume that at least some idea of liberty is good. This naturally leads to another question, "What conception of liberty is morally good?" Actually, I think that I will make a semantic shift here: I will refer to the conception of liberty that is as inclusive as possible while including only principles which may be referred to as liberties and remaining in all respects morally good as true liberty. In cases where there is no need to distinguish between this "true" conception of liberty and other conceptions it may be assumed that by liberty I mean true liberty.
Codifying moral truth, like codifying scientific truth, may be difficult, because, while there exist some very general principles, their interaction can be complicated: Of course we could say that true liberty consists of whatever God says it does, and this is wholly general, but unless we can listen to Him perfectly (and reason perfectly when He withholds information), this will not yield an accurate conception. So let us reason what we can, and at least get some idea.
Before beginning, let me point out three important guiding principles. First, liberty is not just good, but inherently good. That is, there are many things which are good only because they facilitate moral principles; others are themselves basic moral principles, and liberty is among these. This you may take as axiomatic if you like: in fact my source for the statement is simply that God says so, that I have myself received very clear teaching from God on the subject. Second, I require Ethics to be self-consistent. That is, if there is a conflict between ethical principles, then they must not be wholly general, but approximations of the truth (at best), and the deepest reality must resolve this conflict. This rule applies to liberty: The truest principles of liberty cannot contradict one another. Third, it is important for us to distinguish the principle of agency from liberty. The clearest distinction between the two is that agency or free will is a simple reality (although there is an interesting discussion to be had on the subject of determinism and free will, which I will have to address sometime, I do not believe that it is such a deep contradiction as many would hold), a physical truth, if you will. Liberty, on the other hand, is a moral truth, something which ought to be, whether it is or not. Free will is our ability to choose, and no matter what influence may be exerted by others, I may still choose one way or another, even when my ability to act on those choices is limited. Liberty, on the other hand, is the right to act on my choices. If I am physically restrained, then my liberty is certainly reduced, but my agency is not: I may still choose whether to struggle or submit, I may still choose to believe what I will, and I may even choose to exert my muscles as if to rise and walk away from my restraints; I may not, however, actually rise and walk, no matter what I choose. But, then, actually leaving my restraints behind is not, in the purest sense, my choice, but a consequence of my choice to exert myself. Now, I will need to address free will more fully at other times, but the distinction is essential for us to bear in mind that liberty is more than simply the ability to choose.
In attempting to establish a conception of true liberty, I suppose that I should first establish what liberty is not. For one thing, true liberty does not consist of complete freedom from the consequences of our actions and choices. Liberty is not a tool of Hedonism. Actually, such a conception of liberty requires you to say that liberty is itself the only moral truth, which, beside contradicting revelation and conscience, seems independently unlikely: for if there is such a thing as moral truth, which ought to be, then why should we assume that there is only one moral truth? Anyway, even without moral considerations, we have to deal with physical truths as well, and the universe is not kind to the belief that you can ignore the consequences of your actions (try choosing not to eat for a few weeks without consequence, for example). So a true conception of liberty is certainly constrained in at least some particulars.
To what extent, then, is true liberty constrained? Well, perhaps the simplest constraints come from the requirement of self-consistency: If, for example, one person is allowed such liberty that he can steal from his next-door neighbor without consequence, then it infringes on the rights of the neighbor, so that a prohibition against theft is clearly consistent with liberty.
Beyond the need for self-consistency, the need for consistency with other moral principles forces us to say that liberty does not necessarily imply the ability to act without consequence contrary to other moral truths. That is, it is not necessarily inconsistent with liberty for a law to prohibit adultery and to punish it if one believes that adultery is immoral. However, a key question arises as to the role of government: Is it proper for government to punish moral transgression, or should that be left to God? In answer, consider the ability of government to err, both in enforcement and in establishment of moral principles. While not a basic principle of liberty to allow the transgression of moral law, it is dangerous to grant government a primary role and great powers in the enforcement of moral law, save perhaps that God Himself were present and governing. As such, it may be considered consistent with liberty to leave to God the consequences of such transgression, and while not required by liberty in principle, as a practical matter it is more likely to be favorable toward liberty to diminish government's enforcement of moral principles. Government enforcement of moral principles is not always bad, but we should at least be very wary of it and limit such enforcement.
Let me finish with two ideas. First, it is not only consistent with but required by liberty to allow people to pursue their moral duty to the fullest extent possible. Finally, although diminishing government's enforcement of moral principles may be more likely to favor liberty, that does not imply that government must recognize as moral those principles and actions which are in fact immoral. I will have to return to both of these extensively in future posts, both because I have not offered justification and because they are central to key freedoms (such as the freedom of religion), but for now this will have to suffice.
Title: US Declaration of Independence
Of just about any idea or principle the moral realist may ask, "Is it good, bad, or neutral?" Of course, in a previous post I suggested two tools for evaluating the answer to this question: Asking God and conscience. Now, both of these methods confirm to me that at least some idea of liberty (for there is a variety of ideas as to what liberty means) is inherently good; furthermore, it seems that most people agree with this, so it seems that we would do best to assume that at least some idea of liberty is good. This naturally leads to another question, "What conception of liberty is morally good?" Actually, I think that I will make a semantic shift here: I will refer to the conception of liberty that is as inclusive as possible while including only principles which may be referred to as liberties and remaining in all respects morally good as true liberty. In cases where there is no need to distinguish between this "true" conception of liberty and other conceptions it may be assumed that by liberty I mean true liberty.
Codifying moral truth, like codifying scientific truth, may be difficult, because, while there exist some very general principles, their interaction can be complicated: Of course we could say that true liberty consists of whatever God says it does, and this is wholly general, but unless we can listen to Him perfectly (and reason perfectly when He withholds information), this will not yield an accurate conception. So let us reason what we can, and at least get some idea.
Before beginning, let me point out three important guiding principles. First, liberty is not just good, but inherently good. That is, there are many things which are good only because they facilitate moral principles; others are themselves basic moral principles, and liberty is among these. This you may take as axiomatic if you like: in fact my source for the statement is simply that God says so, that I have myself received very clear teaching from God on the subject. Second, I require Ethics to be self-consistent. That is, if there is a conflict between ethical principles, then they must not be wholly general, but approximations of the truth (at best), and the deepest reality must resolve this conflict. This rule applies to liberty: The truest principles of liberty cannot contradict one another. Third, it is important for us to distinguish the principle of agency from liberty. The clearest distinction between the two is that agency or free will is a simple reality (although there is an interesting discussion to be had on the subject of determinism and free will, which I will have to address sometime, I do not believe that it is such a deep contradiction as many would hold), a physical truth, if you will. Liberty, on the other hand, is a moral truth, something which ought to be, whether it is or not. Free will is our ability to choose, and no matter what influence may be exerted by others, I may still choose one way or another, even when my ability to act on those choices is limited. Liberty, on the other hand, is the right to act on my choices. If I am physically restrained, then my liberty is certainly reduced, but my agency is not: I may still choose whether to struggle or submit, I may still choose to believe what I will, and I may even choose to exert my muscles as if to rise and walk away from my restraints; I may not, however, actually rise and walk, no matter what I choose. But, then, actually leaving my restraints behind is not, in the purest sense, my choice, but a consequence of my choice to exert myself. Now, I will need to address free will more fully at other times, but the distinction is essential for us to bear in mind that liberty is more than simply the ability to choose.
In attempting to establish a conception of true liberty, I suppose that I should first establish what liberty is not. For one thing, true liberty does not consist of complete freedom from the consequences of our actions and choices. Liberty is not a tool of Hedonism. Actually, such a conception of liberty requires you to say that liberty is itself the only moral truth, which, beside contradicting revelation and conscience, seems independently unlikely: for if there is such a thing as moral truth, which ought to be, then why should we assume that there is only one moral truth? Anyway, even without moral considerations, we have to deal with physical truths as well, and the universe is not kind to the belief that you can ignore the consequences of your actions (try choosing not to eat for a few weeks without consequence, for example). So a true conception of liberty is certainly constrained in at least some particulars.
To what extent, then, is true liberty constrained? Well, perhaps the simplest constraints come from the requirement of self-consistency: If, for example, one person is allowed such liberty that he can steal from his next-door neighbor without consequence, then it infringes on the rights of the neighbor, so that a prohibition against theft is clearly consistent with liberty.
Beyond the need for self-consistency, the need for consistency with other moral principles forces us to say that liberty does not necessarily imply the ability to act without consequence contrary to other moral truths. That is, it is not necessarily inconsistent with liberty for a law to prohibit adultery and to punish it if one believes that adultery is immoral. However, a key question arises as to the role of government: Is it proper for government to punish moral transgression, or should that be left to God? In answer, consider the ability of government to err, both in enforcement and in establishment of moral principles. While not a basic principle of liberty to allow the transgression of moral law, it is dangerous to grant government a primary role and great powers in the enforcement of moral law, save perhaps that God Himself were present and governing. As such, it may be considered consistent with liberty to leave to God the consequences of such transgression, and while not required by liberty in principle, as a practical matter it is more likely to be favorable toward liberty to diminish government's enforcement of moral principles. Government enforcement of moral principles is not always bad, but we should at least be very wary of it and limit such enforcement.
Let me finish with two ideas. First, it is not only consistent with but required by liberty to allow people to pursue their moral duty to the fullest extent possible. Finally, although diminishing government's enforcement of moral principles may be more likely to favor liberty, that does not imply that government must recognize as moral those principles and actions which are in fact immoral. I will have to return to both of these extensively in future posts, both because I have not offered justification and because they are central to key freedoms (such as the freedom of religion), but for now this will have to suffice.
Title: US Declaration of Independence
Monday, August 15, 2011
Just to Love and Be Loved in Return
Sorry to say, I dropped off the face of the planet, as far as this is concerned, for nearly two months. The reason is simple: I've been out of town, on vacation in the Western United States and at a research meeting in Japan. However, I thought that I'd use this as a springboard for this post.
You see, the primary purpose of my vacation was to see my best friends and family. I went to places that never see tourists (my first stop was Casper, Wyoming), but these stops were far more valuable to me than my day in Venice, Italy. Why? Well, take Casper, for example. I stayed a total of three days (two on the way west, one on the way back) with my friend Jessica and her family. She's probably my best friend: I know that she cares about me, I feel good around her, we get along well, and so forth.
During my days in Casper, it didn't take long to notice how much better I felt than I had in Chicago. Now, don't get me wrong, Chicago is a cool city: just a couple of weeks before I had been absolutely blown away by the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, the food in the city is amazing, the architecture is awesome, and all the other things that you think of that favor a big city. But I found, quite simply, that I arrived in Wyoming and I felt loved, as I hadn't felt in Chicago.
Now, I'm not talking about romance here. Jessica is a beautiful woman (and I'll even admit that I like her), but that's simply not what I'm talking about. When I say that I love, I mean that the happiness and well-being of another person is important to me, at least as important as my own; when I feel that I am loved, I mean that there is a person who really cares about me.
So, though you might call it a cliche as it's been said so often, love is important, even essential. It makes life better, it's even on that list of things that make life worth living. It might sound cliche, but my experience suggests that days with friends are better than those in Rome, and I don't know what I would do without friends like Jessica.
Title: "Nature Boy" by Eden Ahbez
You see, the primary purpose of my vacation was to see my best friends and family. I went to places that never see tourists (my first stop was Casper, Wyoming), but these stops were far more valuable to me than my day in Venice, Italy. Why? Well, take Casper, for example. I stayed a total of three days (two on the way west, one on the way back) with my friend Jessica and her family. She's probably my best friend: I know that she cares about me, I feel good around her, we get along well, and so forth.
During my days in Casper, it didn't take long to notice how much better I felt than I had in Chicago. Now, don't get me wrong, Chicago is a cool city: just a couple of weeks before I had been absolutely blown away by the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, the food in the city is amazing, the architecture is awesome, and all the other things that you think of that favor a big city. But I found, quite simply, that I arrived in Wyoming and I felt loved, as I hadn't felt in Chicago.
Now, I'm not talking about romance here. Jessica is a beautiful woman (and I'll even admit that I like her), but that's simply not what I'm talking about. When I say that I love, I mean that the happiness and well-being of another person is important to me, at least as important as my own; when I feel that I am loved, I mean that there is a person who really cares about me.
So, though you might call it a cliche as it's been said so often, love is important, even essential. It makes life better, it's even on that list of things that make life worth living. It might sound cliche, but my experience suggests that days with friends are better than those in Rome, and I don't know what I would do without friends like Jessica.
Title: "Nature Boy" by Eden Ahbez
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